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Levels of explanation in biological
psychology
HUIB LOOREN DE JONG
ABSTRACT Until recently, the notions of function and multiple realization were supposed to save the
autonomy of psychological explanations. Furthermore, the concept of supervenience presumably
allows both dependence of mind on brain and non-reducibility of mind to brain, reconciling
materialism with an independent explanatory role for mental and functional concepts and explana-
tions. Eliminativism is often seen as the main or only alternative to such autonomy. It gladly accepts
abandoning or thoroughly reconstructing the psychological level, and considers reduction if successful
as equivalent with elimination. In comparison with the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of biology
has developed more subtle and complex ideas about functions, laws, and reductive explanation than
the stark dichotomy of autonomy or elimination. It has been argued that biology is a patchwork of
local laws, each with different explanatory interests and more or less limited scope. This points to a
pluralistic, domain-speci c and multi-level view of explanations in biology. Explanatory pluralism
has been proposed as an alternative to eliminativism on the one hand and methodological dualism on
the other hand. It holds that theories at different levels of description, like psychology and neuro-
science, can co-evolve, and mutually in uence each other, without the higher-level theory being
replaced by, or reduced to, the lower-level one. Such ideas seem to tally with the pluralistic character
of biological explanation. In biological psychology, explanatory pluralism would lead us to expect
many local and non-reductive interactions between biological, neurophysiological, psychological and
evolutionary explanations of mind and behavior. This idea is illustrated by an example from
behavioral genetics, where genetics, physiology and psychology constitute distinct but interrelated
levels of explanation. Accounting for such a complex patchwork of related explanations seems to
require a more sophisticated and precise way of looking at levels than the existing ideas on (reductive
and non-reductive) explanation in the philosophy of mind.
1. Introduction
Some concern for the future of psychology as a discipline seems in order. Neuro-
science, genetics, psychopharmacology, and evolutionary biology are making inroads
in the traditional domain of psychology, the explanation of behavior. According to
some, psychology may thus face annexation of its subject (human behavior and
mental life) by the different branches of biology. Many philosophers of mind have
nevertheless argued that psychology has its own identity, residing in the higher-level,
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mentalistic and functional, vocabulary of its explanations. In this paper some of the
main options for relations between psychological and biological (genetic, neurophys-
iological) theories are sketched, and a recent showpiece of biological psychology
(behavioral genetics) is brie y introduced. Since biological psychology is typically an
interlevel enterprise, we will look for models for interlevel relations in philosophy of
psychology, as well as in philosophy of biology. Surprisingly perhaps, philosophy of
biology seems to offer more resources for understanding relations between levels.
We will argue that the traditional ideas on reduction in the philosophy of science are
too simple, and that in coming to grips with the way this kind of science is really
done, we need more sophisticated models for interlevel relations. Apart from the
issue of which models of reduction are illuminating in understanding actual explana-
tory practices in science, we will also brie y look at some more metaphysically
and/or normatively motivated concerns about constraints on interlevel explanations.
2. Varieties of interlevel relations in neuroscience and psychology
2.1. Classical reduction
The classical account of reduction follows from the deductive–nomological (D-N)
model of explanation (Hempel, 1965; see also Nagel, 1961). It holds that explaining
an event involves deducing it (more precisely, a statement describing it) from a
theory plus boundary conditions; likewise, reduction is deducing a higher-level
theory from a lower-level theory plus boundary conditions. What constitutes a
higher level is not very clear, but the background ontology assumes that higher levels
are characterized by more complex entities, that complex entities are composed of
simpler entities, and that the former are explained by reducing them to their
elementary constituents (see Oppenheim & Putnam, 1958/1991, for the relation
between microreduction, decomposition and the notion of levels; for the idea of
working one’s way back to the constituents as explanation in physics—the “arrow of
reduction”—see Weinberg, 1993).
Nagel (1961, pp. 354, 433–435) gives two conditions for theory reduction:
connectability and deducibility. The deducibility condition implies that theories are
 nished and formalized. Bridge laws take care of the connectability condition by
establishing cross-theoretical identities. The textbook example of a bridge law is:
temperature is average kinetic energy of molecules in an ideal gas. After connecting
the vocabularies of the two theories through such bridge laws, the (formalized)
theory of thermodynamics can (ideally) be deduced from (i.e. reduced to) statistical
mechanics, its concepts will map nicely onto those of the reducing theory, and its
ontology can be retained.
Unfortunately, these conditions are almost never realized. When a theory is
reduced, the meaning of its terms is usually changed in the process. A standard
example is the difference in meaning associated with the concept of mass in
Newtonian and in quantum physics, respectively. This makes identi cation and the
formulation of bridge laws impossible. Moreover, since the reduced theory is usually
in some way or other corrected by the reducing theory, the former can strictly
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speaking not be logically consistent with the latter. Assuming that the reducing
theory is correct, the reduced theory must have been at least partially false, and
therefore cannot be deduced from the former (it is logically impossible to deduce a
false statement from a true statement). The classical (Nagel) reduction model
assumes consistency and meaning invariance between reduced and reducing theory,
and as was realized early in the history of modern philosophy of science, meaning
change and corrections are essential for empirical progress (Feyerabend, 1968). As
Kuhn (1970) famously argued, after scienti c revolutions worldviews change and
ontologies are abandoned. Furthermore, the kind of  nished and formalized theories
required for deduction are extremely rare.
Of course, the intention of the D-N model was to provide a rational reconstruc-
tion of scienti c explanation. The model belongs to the context of justi cation, not
to the context of discovery, and it could be argued that the scarcity of real life
instances does not compromise the ideal case (cf. Schaffner, 1993, p. 496, who
suggests that a unilevel clari ed science may be hoped for, for which the gappy and
bushy connections in interlevel fragmentary sciences may be precursors). However,
the fact remains that the classical view of reduction does not give a plausible picture
of scienti c practice and scienti c progress: the framework it proposes as the ideal
type of reduction does not  t obvious cases of progress and successful reduction,
and does little to clarify what constitutes reductive success. The consequences of this
failure are interesting.
Broadly speaking, two quite different morals for the future of psychology can be
drawn from the failure of the classical reduction model. The impossibility of
establishing cross-theoretical identities (expressed in bridge laws) between mental
and physiological processes was hailed as a virtue by early cognitive psychology,
since it presumably guaranteed the irreducibility, and thereby the autonomy for
psychology vis-a`-vis neuroscience (Fodor, 1981a). More precisely, the domain of
psychology was identi ed as that of multiply realized functions, and multiple
realization supposedly precludes bridge laws. The other response was eliminativism
(Churchland, 1981), of which New Wave Reductionism (Bickle, 1998) is the latest
and most sophisticated offshoot. This tries to incorporate the failure of the con-
nectability and deducibility conditions, i.e. the need to correct the reduced theory,
in a more sophisticated model of intertheoretic reduction (Churchland & Church-
land, 1994; Schaffner, 1993).
3. Multiple realizability and its problems
Until recently, the notions of function and multiple realization were supposed to
save the autonomy of psychological explanations. Fodor (1981a,b, 1990) and others
have argued that as long as intentional laws can be found that explain and predict
behavior, their relation with underlying neurophysiology is in principle not relevant
for explanation. Mental processes are understood as functions with a speci c causal
role (e.g. hunger causes foraging behavior), and, like programs in computer science,
this can be multiply realized. Hunger in octopuses is a different neural state from
hunger in man, but that does not matter for understanding its causal role, which
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may be relevantly similar (Putnam, 1961) (perhaps even silicon chips may be said to
be hungry if they exhibit a certain functional state that produces food-seeking
behavior). The hardware (or neural wetware) is merely implementation. The core
business of classical reductionism, identifying mental functions with their neural
realizers, would obscure the functional generalizations that constitute psychological
theory. Functional and intentional laws would be invisible in the physiological
machinery (Fodor, 1981b), in the same way as the logical structure of a computer
program would be invisible in the physical states of the machine. Furthermore, it
would go unnoticed how different neural systems may serve the same functions.
Thus, on this view, psycho-neural reduction by identifying mental and physical
events is not only impossible but also undesirable.
This amounts to methodological dualism (or, potentially, pluralism): functional
psychology has its own vocabulary, laws and explanations, which are distinct from
physics. That is not to deny that every function is realized somehow in some
material substrate.
3.1. Supervenience
The concept of supervenience (Kim, 1993) captures both this ontological depen-
dence of the mind on the brain, and the methodological autonomy of psychology.
Supervenience holds that individuals that are indiscernible with respect to their
physical properties are indiscernible with respect to their mental properties. How-
ever, it does not exclude that mental properties may have different realizers. Thus,
the covariance of mental and physical properties is asymmetrical. The dependence
of mind on brain is reconciled with the non-reducibility of mind to brain; superve-
nience combines materialism with an independent explanatory role for mental and
functional concepts and explanations—brie y, with methodological dualism.
Multiple realization does not preclude the discovery of psychophysical connec-
tions—a functional state may be associated with an open disjunction of many
distinct physical states. The crux is that these are not (bridge-) lawlike. Presumably,
an ontologically heterogeneous collection of realizers is incompatible with orderly
bridge laws connecting natural kinds (Kim, 1992). Multiple realization thus pro-
vides  rm ground for non-reductive materialism: the functional states that are
characteristic of psychology are physically realized, but the unavailability of bridge
laws blocks classical theory reduction.
3.2. Local reductions
Recently, however, Kim (1998) has questioned the feasibility of non-reductive
materialism, and argued that functionalism properly understood implies a reductive
relation between psychology and neurophysiology. Kim argues that supervenience,
non-reductive materialism, and multiple realization do not legitimate an auton-
omous higher level of mental or functional explanation. His metaphysical point of
departure is that only entities with causal powers are to be taken serious as potential
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explanations (“to be is to be causally effective”). If we assume that the physical
world is causally closed (the alternative would be that some spooky force could
intervene in physical processes), then there simply is no room for independent
mental causation, and hence no room for other than physical explanation. The use
of functional characterizations is to de ne the explanandum, the role a phenomenon
has, but this is only the  rst step towards real explanation—which, in Kim’s view,
must be causal explanation. The next step is  nding the realizers (in the case of
mental processes, the underlying neural processes), and developing a theory how
these produce the phenomenon.
Kim calls this the functionalizing strategy, and claims that is the way science
works. For example, pharmacology de nes the functional role of a substance as
dormitivity, and then looks for the chemical substance that realizes that role, and
tries to  nd out why it has that speci c effect. Functionalization amounts to
reduction. Functions have no causal powers, hence no (genuine, metaphysically
respectable) explanatory powers; functional states are roles,  lled by physical states,
they are the second order effects of a  rst order that is ultimately, really physical, and
are to be explained in physical terms. So, a successful reduction is not as Nagel
thought, the derivation of higher order laws form lower order plus boundary
conditions. Kim rejects the classical view of (Nagel type) reduction. No bridge laws
are available, and even if there were, these would not explain anything, but just state
correlations that may well be compatible with dualism or emergentism. Hence, not
even ontological simpli cation would result from traditional reduction via bridge
laws between mental and physical terms. Functionalist reduction explains bridge
laws as identity of second order and  rst order properties, whenever the physical
mechanism  ts the mental description.
In Kim’s view, the real causal-explanatory work is done at the level of the
realizers. What seems like multiply realized properties (as in intentional laws in
psychology) is really a disjunctive set of physical properties. When for some mental
or functional property Putnam–Fodor-style functionalism applies, then this multiply
realized higher-level property must be causally heterogeneous: having different
realizers, it generalizes over a disorderly jumble of physical causes. Therefore, it
lacks physical and hence explanatory integrity. It may well be, Kim suggests, that the
(functional) concepts of psychology do not refer to real kinds in nature, and that,
since we want only ontologically sound natural kinds in explanations, they are better
dispensed with, and replaced by the real neural properties. Then the real explanation
is in local, perhaps species-speci c, reductions of the functional mental properties to
each of its distinct realizing neural properties.
Thus, Kim pictures a kind of reduction without bridge laws, and gives some
serious arguments for rejecting multiple realization arguments for autonomy. It
should be noted that whereas Putnam and Fodor seem happy to restrict their
defense of the autonomy of functional explanations to arguments from the philoso-
phy of science (the absence of bridge laws and the impossibility of classical re-
duction), Kim introduces metaphysical concerns: the causal impotence of
higher-level causes precludes in his view a legitimate explanatory role.
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3.3. Heuristic versus reductionist identi cation: pluralism
Thus, Kim gives the multiple realization argument a reductionist turn: we should
abandon functional generalizations as non-explanations and look for the local
reductive relations. However, even if we agree that classical functionalism is in
danger of con ating empty “cheap” generalizations (Churchland, 1981) with real
explanatory laws, and that autonomy has a sti ing effect on progress in neuropsy-
chology, the reductionist conclusion does not follow. Like Kim, McCauley and
Bechtel (2001) and Bechtel and Mundale (1999) reject multiple realization argu-
ments for autonomy, and they advocate (heuristic) identi cation of mental and
physical properties. However, their argument is both more subtle and more empiri-
cal than Kim’s. They argue that this (heuristic) identi cation is relative to the level
of detail (coarseness of grain size). Grain size is a context-dependent and theory-rel-
ative, ultimately empirical, affair. For example, whether hunger in an octopus is the
same as in humans or Martians depends on the level of analysis. It may be an
excellent research question how differences in neural make-up explain difference in
the functional properties of hunger in different species. This is the crux of heuristic
identi cation (Heuristic Identity Theory; see McCauley & Bechtel, 2001): a tenta-
tive bridge between two sets of theories, most typically between those of neuropsy-
chology and those of functional or cognitive psychology.
Bechtel and Mundale (1999) show that, in animal studies, neuropsychologists
have always exploited the homology between nervous systems of different species to
draw conclusions about the functions of human brain areas, and multiple realization
is no barrier to successful identi cation of cognitive functions with brain structures
across different species. The interesting consequence is that from the  rst assess-
ment that a putative functional or psychological property is multiply realized we can
proceed in opposite ways: either towards  ne-grained local reduction, or towards
broad, abstract functional generalizations. Sometimes, we may want broad general-
izations, abstracting from implementational details (for example, when we lump
together hunger in different species as having the same causal role); sometimes we
may want local narrow reductions, individuating different neural mechanisms in
different species as realizing different functional (mental) properties; and sometimes
somewhere in between splitting functions and lumping them—to borrow a phrase
from Sober (1999).
So, (heuristic) identi cation is more pluralist than Kim seems to realize: it
depends on explanatory interest and grain size. There is more to  nding identities
in cognitive neuroscience than the unique causal-ontological rock bottom Kim
demands; identi cation is relative to multiple explanatory interests. As we will argue
below, the pluralist view on identi cation seems to  t interlevel contexts better than
Kim’s functionalizing/reductionist view.
4. New Wave Reductionism
In the parting of ways after the failure of classical theory reduction, eliminativism
(and its latest incarnation, New Wave Reductionism) has been the main (or only)
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alternative to autonomy (Bickle, 1998; Churchland, 1981). It gladly accepts aban-
doning or thoroughly reconstructing the psychological level, and considers reduction
if successful as equivalent with (potential) elimination and replacement by neurosci-
enti c concepts and explanations. Churchland writes: “… what a successful re-
duction shows is that one way of conceiving things can be safely, smoothly, and—if
the excess empirical content of Tn over Sn is corroborated—pro tably displaced by
another way of conceiving things. And this, I submit, is the function of reduction.
A successful reduction is a fell-swoop proof of displaceability; and it succeeds by showing
that the new theory contains as a substructure an equipotent image of the old”
(Churchland, 1979, p. 82; italics in original).
Bickle (1998, 2001) is one of the most articulate defenders of the thesis that
neuroscience will replace psychology. Interestingly, he presents New Wave Reduc-
tionism (NWR) as an empirical bet on the outcome of the success of replacing
cognitive or folk-psychological theories by neuroscienti c theories. This makes it
interesting to evaluate NWR as an account of our behavioral genetics case study
below.
NWR presumably solves the problem of elimination versus smooth reduction.
An early attempt in this direction was made by Schaffner (see his 1993, Chapter 9),
who proposed to construct a corrected version of the to-be-reduced theory, that can
then be deduced from the new reducing theory. A similar proposal was made by
Hooker, the difference with Schaffner’s being that Hooker proposed to formulate
the corrected theory (TR*) in the vocabulary of the new reducing theory (TB),
whereas in Schaffner’s proposal it was to be drawn from the old reduced theory
(TR). The Hooker theory and the Schaffner theory were both intended as answers
to a particular nasty problem with the connectability condition, namely, that the
reduced theory is usually false, and a false conclusion can not be logically deduced
from a true theory (the reducing theory). Bickle (1998, 2001) presents his theory as
an extension of Hooker’s; in his version of NWR, no connecting principles (bridge
laws) are needed, since the vocabulary of the corrected theory is already part of the
reducing theory. NWR thus solves the connectability and derivability problems. The
price to be paid for this innovation is that strictly speaking the old theory as such is
not reduced, but replaced—or at least rewritten.
A novelty introduced by the new model of reduction is that the degree of
correction with the old theory is now an important parameter of the reduction. This
may range from almost perfect retention (smooth reduction) to complete rejection
(bumpy reduction) at the other extreme; in ontological terms, the continuum ranges
from perfect retention to total replacement of a theory’s ontology. The identi cation
of temperature with mean kinetic energy is an example of smooth reduction, where
the thermodynamic concepts map almost completely onto those of statistical
mechanics, and the phlogiston theory of combustion, which was entirely replaced by
the oxygen theory, is an example of bumpy reduction. The smooth reduction end
corresponds with the D-N micro reduction with cross-theoretic identities (bridge
laws) that guarantee connectability and derivability, the bumpy reduction end with
Kuhnian revolutions. In between are varying degrees of correction of the reduced
theory (Bickle, 1998, p. 30; Churchland & Churchland, 1994).
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4.1. How neuroscience reduces cognition
Bickle’s (1998, 2001) showcase of the reduction of cognitive processes to neural
ones is LTP, (Shors & Matzell, 1997), where in his reconstruction the replacement
of the (functional) laws of associative learning by neural mechanisms has already
been accomplished. This amounts in his view to intermediately bumpy reduction
(Schouten & Looren de Jong, 1999, 1997). Bickle (1998) presents this as a case of
revisionary physicalism: a genuinely cognitive theory reduces (with revision and
perhaps “enrichment”) to neuroscience. More precisely, he envisages no total
elimination, but there will be signi cant conceptual change, and therefore no
cross-theoretic or property identities in the reduction of cognitive psychology to
neuroscience.
Quantitative predictions in cognitive vocabulary (like representation, infor-
mation, redundancy, surprise) are smoothly mapped onto underlying mechanisms of
intracellular mechanisms (presynaptic potentiation, released neurotransmitter, etc.).
These mechanisms form the neural alphabet, and combinations and sequences of
these (in combination with more complex neural wiring, interneurons, etc.) produce
phenomena functionally characterized as cognitive. This is reduction in the sense
that the ontology of the functional mathematical model of conditioning is related to
the components underlying these functional phenomena (in this case, associative
learning). It constitutes a nice case of combinatorial reduction: the simple intracellu-
lar mechanisms can, when properly combined, presumably yield more complex
kinds of cognition.
Applied to the prospects of the reduction of folk-psychology, Bickle positions
his NWR as an alternative to traditional options of autonomy (functionalism),
identity theory (smooth reduction with cross-theoretic bridge laws), and eliminative
materialism (giving up the traditional mentalistic idiom, and starting to talk about
our fellow humans in terms of neuroscience; Churchland, 1981). He also rejects
non-reductive materialism, including property dualism, as thinly disguised dualism.
4.2. Reduction and/or co-evolution?
Three characteristics mark a successful, reasonably smooth reduction (Bickle, 1998,
2001). First, the reduced theory approximates (gives a global, abstract, coarse-
grained description of) the phenomena for which the reducing theory describes the
real underlying dynamics. Second, each of the concepts of the reduced theory
fragments into several concepts of the (more  nely grained) reducing theory. Thus,
the former are “structured” (i.e. associated with distinct composite processes of the
reducing theory). Third, in revisionary cases, there are mutual constraints and
feedback from reduced to reducing theory, and vice versa. Thus, revisionary cases
display conceptual change, not complete retention nor complete elimination.
Bickle’s third characteristic of mutual feedback is somewhat surprising. According to
NWR, the old concepts in an intertheoretic reduction are, to some extent, re-
described in the superior vocabulary of the new theory; at the bumpy end of the
continuum, the old concepts are entirely eliminated, at the smooth end they are
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vindicated as a limited subset of the new theory (Churchland & Churchland, 1994,
p. 48). Importantly, in all cases, the new reducing theory is the sole arbiter of
whatever value the old concepts may have, and determines whether they deserve a
place in new scheme of things. Such an asymmetrical relationship seems incompat-
ible with real mutual feedback. Bickle also fails to give reasons why one would want
to retain folk-psychological characteristics, even in revised (enriched, re ned) guise,
once we have the reducing theory that reveals the real underlying dynamics. (Kim
would probably disapprove of such weak-hearted reductionism.) Nor is it clear how
the (after all not replaced) higher-level concepts could have anything valuable to
contribute in their supposed feedback to the lower level. This omission suggests a
more subtle way of looking at interlevel relations than either autonomy or elimin-
ation.
4.3. Intertheoretic relations: diachronous and synchronous
As mentioned, after the failure of classical reductionism, two alternatives emerged:
functionalism and New Wave Reductionism (Bickle, 1998; Churchland, 1981,
1989). The latter gladly accepts abandoning or thoroughly reconstructing the
psychological level, and in his more radical moments Churchland considers success-
ful reduction as equivalent with the possibility of elimination (in his less radical
moments, he paints a picture of a slowly maturing marriage rather than a sudden
takeover; Churchland & Churchland, 1994, p. 53).
Looking carefully, there is an ambiguity in this picture: the reduction–replace-
ment continuum seems to con ate theory succession with theory reduction. At least
conceptually, one might distinguish between a diachronic dimension of intertheo-
retic relations (theory succession, where an old theory is more or less corrected and
replaced by or smoothly integrated in a new theory), from a synchronic dimension,
where at the same point in time theories make contact, in ways that vary from
classical micro reductions to coexistence of incompatible theories. In the latter case,
there is no demand for replacement of the reduced theory in time (McCauley,
1996). Rather, the relation between levels can be described as selection pressure,
mutually constraining theorizing at both levels. Although Bickle (1998) proposes a
criterion for distinguishing genuine theory reduction from mere theory succession
(pp. 30–32), this turns out to be a more or less formal measure of smoothness on the
retention–replacement continuum (pp. 100–101), not a distinction between syn-
chronous coexistence and diachronous succession.
To sum up, the traditional options of (smooth-to-bumpy) reduction and
autonomy constitute too low-dimensional a conceptual space. Apparently, some sort
of coexistence in time (synchronic) should be envisaged.
5. Explanatory pluralism
Explanatory pluralism (McCauley, 1996) has been proposed as an alternative to
eliminativism on the one hand and methodological dualism on the other hand. It
emphasizes that theories at different levels of description (e.g. psychology and
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neuroscience) can co-evolve, and mutually in uence each other, without the higher-
level theory being replaced by, or reduced to, the lower-level one.
Heuristic Identity Theory (HIT) (McCauley & Bechtel, 2001) expands these
ideas. It holds that hypothesizing heuristic identities between levels or domains is a
way to construe interlevel relations. For example, McCauley and Bechtel (2001)
show how in cognitive neuroscience, hypothesizing that some function in cognitive
psychology can be identi ed with a neuroanatomical mechanism leads to progress in
both  elds. In their case the dorsal and ventral stream in the brain can be identi ed
with location and object identi cation (the “where” and “what” system), respect-
ively, in vision (in further research, the real story turned out to be much more
complicated, leading to re nements and revisions in both theories). Heuristic
identities are in some ways the opposite of the classical identities enshrined in bridge
laws: heuristic identities are dynamic and revisable rather than  nished, hypothetical
rather than formalized—rather than results of  nished research, they are directions
for further investigation. Hypothesizing identities between levels thus may lead to
intra-level modi cations, adjusting either the upper-level psychological theory (in
this example, about the function of the visual identi cation systems) or the lower-
level theory (about the neuroanatomical mechanisms) or both. Thus, we see here the
outline of a model of co-evolution that  eshes out the notion of synchronous
coexistence of different levels of explanation.
Such ideas seem to tally with the pluralistic character of biological explanation.
Below, we will look beyond philosophy of mind, to the philosophy of biology to
illustrate and substantiate such synchronic coexistence of theories as advocated by
explanatory pluralists. As we are interested in aspects of reduction and interlevel
relations in psychology, biological psychology will serve as a case study, since it
combines functional/psychological, neuroscienti c and (most recently) genetic theo-
ries and explanatory schemes. In the case of behavioral genetics, theories from
neurophysiology, personality psychology, and molecular genetics interact. Recent
developments in molecular genetics have opened at least a possibility of relating the
base pair sequence on the genome to personality characteristics. Such a relation is
very complex and de es as yet attempts in the philosophy of science to lay down
necessary and suf cient conditions for reduction. From the perspective of explana-
tory pluralism, we would expect to  nd many local and non-reductive interactions
between biological, neurophysiological, psychological and evolutionary explanations
of mind and behavior.
5.1. Pluralism in biology: a patchwork of laws, functions and interlevel theories
In comparison with the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of biology has developed
more subtle and complex ideas about functions, laws, and reductive explanation
than the stark dichotomy of autonomy or elimination. First, philosophers of biology
are less concerned about laws, which are the core of D-N explanation and reduction:
since evolution is contingent natural history, universal laws in biology are rare.
Furthermore, the concept of function in biology is multidimensional (Mitchell,
1995): for example, in some explanations it includes the history of the selection of
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a trait, while other explanations focus on a trait’s current causal role in a system (see
Sober, 1985). Schaffner (1993) and others have argued that biology is a patchwork
of local laws, each with different explanatory interests and more or less limited
scope.
This points to a pluralistic, domain-speci c, and multi-level view of explana-
tions in biology. Contrary to popular accounts of Darwinism as a comprehensive
worldview, most philosophers of biology agree evolutionary biology is not an
integrated hard science like physics (Brandon, 1990; Schaffner, 1993). For example,
Brandon (1990, p. 134) writes: “… I do not think evolutionary theory is a theory at
all. Rather, it is a family of theories (and goals, methods, and metaphysics) related
in complex and ever-changing ways.” The consensus seems to be that biology has
no, or very few, real laws, that biological kinds are historical and contingent. Biology
is largely “instrumental,” i.e. it is disuni ed, consisting mainly of a toolbox of
heuristic devices, it is not a set of truths (Rosenberg, 1994), and it deals in natural
history (van der Steen, 2000), not in universal laws. It might be contended that in
biological explanation the more interesting contrast is between mechanisms and
laws, not between contingent and universal. Although much could be said about the
“lawlessness” of biology, and the role of mechanistic explanation (Bechtel &
Richardson, 1993) and causal regularities (Waters, 1998), for the present purposes
I focus on the contingent, disuni ed and instrumental character of biology.
5.1.1. Laws and “empty” generalizations. A recent issue in the philosophy of biology
is whether (evolutionary) biology has real laws, and the consensus seems to be that,
maybe surprisingly, it hasn’t. Van der Steen (2000) argues that natural history, not
general and timeless laws, is the main ingredient of explanation. Natural history
refers to non-universal claims with a low degree of generality, and thus contrasts
with universal laws. Seemingly general concepts like “ tness” and “adaptation” are
empty placeholders that have little or no empirical content, and only acquire their
explanatory value when  lled with natural history. A presumably general law like the
Principle of Natural Selection (PNS) has no real empirical content. A core concept
like  tness, in the sense in which it is used in population genetics, only states that
there are some features that explain survival, but it does not yet say what these
factors are; therefore it has little explanatory force. Only when one speci es which
features in what animal in which environment contribute to survival does the notion
get body, but then it loses its generality.
To quote Brandon (1990), PNS is a schematic law, and has “no empirical
content of its own, that is, it has no biological empirical content” (p. 139), and is as
such not testable. It is only testable when applied to concrete cases, with empirical
details  lling the empty, merely heuristic mould of adaptive thinking. But then it
applies only to a speci c population in a speci c environment, and loses its
generality. According to Brandon, PNS may be useful in structuring explanations,
i.e. in setting up a search space, providing heuristics, but not as an explanation in
itself.
Thus, at least some of the most basic generalizations in evolutionary biology are
not classical laws, but empty generalizations, that must be  lled in by domain-
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speci c mechanisms provided by other branches of biology. The generalizations are
however valuable in setting the agenda, and de ning the explanandum.
Furthermore, when these mechanisms are  lled in, differences emerge. Consid-
ering the way evolution works, it would really be amazing if the details of the
different applications of PNS were similar in an explanatorily interesting way. As
Beatty has argued, evolution is a contingent process; therefore, it would be miracu-
lous if there were a single mechanism underlying all the taxa of the evolutionary tree
(Beatty, 1996). Beatty connects his idea, the evolutionary contingency thesis, explicitly
with theoretical pluralism. The most plausible explanation for the lack of general
laws may be the empirical fact of evolutionary contingency. There may simply be no
single mechanism for natural selection, or for gene regulation, or for speciation that
applies everywhere, but there may be a variety of mechanisms, a different one in
different branches of the evolutionary tree. Sometimes, when a “frozen accident”
such as the emergence and subsequent establishment of the genetic code occurs, a
single law will apply to all taxa, but usually there will be parallel evolution, and
hence no general laws, but rather a lot of domain-speci c, non-universal mecha-
nisms.
So, when going from higher-level functions to lower-level mechanisms, general-
izations tend to fragment: they are realized by different mechanisms in different
domains. This means that functionalism in Putnam–Fodor style is right in emphasiz-
ing the barrier multiple realization poses for reduction, but wrong in proposing
function as an autonomous level of explanation.
5.1.2. The multiplicity of functional explanation. A related issue is that the concept of
function, as it  gures in adaptive functional explanation, has multiple meanings and
multiple uses (Mitchell, 1995). Analyzing the central and controversial concept of
function in the philosophy of biology, Mayr (1988) claims that there are two largely
different  elds in biology, which coexist alongside each other, using different
concepts and methods: functional biology and evolutionary biology. Functional
biology considers the operation and interaction of structural elements, and their
contribution to the system (the “how” question). Evolutionary biology looks at
selectional history (the “why” or “how come” question). In this way, several levels
of explanation for the same event may be said to coexist, depending on time scale
and explanatory interest. For example (simplifying Mayr’s case), the cause of
migration may be said to be the physiological mechanisms in the birds’ brain
noticing the shorter daylight span, or the evolutionary selection for species that get
moving when food supply is short. Correspondingly, philosophers of biology dis-
tinguish several notions of function that serve different explanatory interests: some
explanations focus on current and future systemic function, others on historical
adaptation (Amundson & Lauder, 1994; Enc & Adams, 1992; Mitchell, 1995).
Likewise, Mitchell (1995) argues that dispositional and etiological functions
serve distinct explanatory purposes: dispositional explanation answers the question
how a trait contributes to survival in a certain environment, whereas the etiological
explanation answers the question why a trait is present. She urges us to consider
such explanation as doing different things, directed at different targets, providing
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answers at different levels of abstraction. Several such explanatory projects may
coexist (e.g. dispositional explanation identi es the function of a trait, etiological
explanation explains why a trait is there). Explanations are speci c for domains
and/or explanatory interests. The multiplicity of function means that a unique and
complete functional explanation is not likely to be discovered. The Putnam–Fodor
tradition in the philosophy of mind that sets apart a self-contained level of functional
explanation must be misguided: function means different things in different explana-
tory contexts.
To sum up, analysis of explanation in biology suggests that biologists do not
consider functional analysis a complete explanation; only when the implementing
mechanisms and the alternative solutions are speci ed do we have a candidate
explanation. These mechanisms of course are domain-speci c (Wouters, 1999):
pluralism of explanation means pluralism of levels and grain sizes, and interlevel
interaction between these. The  lling-in of empirical details requires continuous
border traf c between levels—brief co-evolution of theories at different levels,
exerting selection pressure both ways.
5.1.3. The historicity of biological explanation. Rosenberg (2001) offers an interesting
explanation why “biology is history (all the way down)”: the concepts of functional
biology re ect the process of natural selection operating on local conditions. Natural
selection constantly changes these conditions; its history is a matter of moves and
countermoves, an evolutionary arms race, where organisms change their own design
space, and change the environment in which they and other organisms have to make
their living. Therefore, the kinds evolutionary biology posits are also subject to
historical change. Thus, biology is essentially historical; empirical generalizations
refer to historical contingencies. Rosenberg (2001, p. 148) writes: “The principles of
the theory of natural selection are the only real laws in biology. Beyond the bare
theory of natural selection itself, the rest of biology is a set of subdisciplines
historically conditioned by the operation of natural selection on local circumstances
during the history of the Earth.” The apparent generalizations of functional biology
are really spatio-temporally restricted statements.
To sum up, beyond the locality of biological explanations, Rosenberg empha-
sizes the historicity and contingency of biological explanations; its generalizations
and concepts may change when evolution moves along its contingent trajectory
through design space (Dennett, 1995).
5.1.4. Middle range theories: the locality of biological explanation. The points made
above suggest that biological explanations can be seen as located in the middle range
(Schaffner, 1993), between universal physical and chemical laws on the one side,
and universal but empirically empty (Brandon, 1990) evolutionary heuristics on the
other side. Schaffner (1993, pp. 119–121, 519–530) argues that one should dis-
tinguish between two kinds of universality: the  rst refers to the presence of a trait
in a more or less wide range of organisms, the other to the “same cause, same effect”
universality of causal mechanisms. So, biology uses causal generalizations which
may, unlike physical laws, have only limited distribution across populations. Biology
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is in the business of  nding generalizations of limited scope. The laws of physics are
everywhere the same, but the same evolutionary function may be realized in different
mechanisms in different domains: the range (or distribution) may vary as a matter
of evolutionary contingency or natural history.
Biology has no general timeless laws, unlike physics. It has lots of domain-
speci c, context-dependent and historical generalizations. The scope of generaliza-
tions is almost always limited to some branch or other of the evolutionary tree,
almost never general, exceptionless and timeless. Moreover, the implementation or
realization relation between the concepts at different levels may also be historically
conditioned and domain-speci c. A function may be subserved by different mecha-
nisms at different points in its odyssey through design space (e.g. exaptations—
Gould & Vrba, 1998—are traits that have been put into service for another function
than that for which they were selected). When the arms race between organisms
changes, the function of mechanisms, and the relation between them and what they
subserve also varies.
Keeping these ideas in mind will help us understand that in biology several
domains can coexist synchronically. Darden and Maull (1977) describe cases where
interlevel theories connect domains of inquiry. Explanatory extension is Kitcher’s
(1981) label for the way a theory from one domain can solve problems in another
domain—for example, classical and molecular genetics remain distinct endeavors,
but knowledge of molecular genetics can explain the mechanisms behind the
behavior of Mendelian genes (however, see Waters, 1994, and Rosenberg, 1997, for
a reductionist view on classical genetics). This seems a better model for biological
psychology than NWR. Let us see how and why explanatory pluralism in biological
psychology is bolstered by these ideas.
6. Biological psychology
6.1. Behavioral genetics: twins and the genome
A case in point is behavioral genetics, where genetics, physiology and psychology
constitute distinct but interrelated levels of explanation. The traditional approach in
behavioral genetics, twin research, has recently been supplemented by molecular
methods. Traditionally, populations of monozygotic (MZ) and dizygotic (DZ) twins
were compared, to obtain estimates of heritability coef cients for phenotypic traits
(McGue & Bouchard, 1998; Plomin et al., 1997), like intelligence (Plomin &
DeFries, 1998), personality, etc. Since MZ are 100% genetic identical, and DZ
50%, and were raised in the same environment, comparing these siblings allows the
partitioning of population variance on some trait into genetic, shared environmental,
and unique variance (including noise). Typical results are that 50% variance in
intelligence in a population can be attributed to genetic factors, and that this
percentage is higher for elderly twins than for young ones. Path analysis makes
possible more subtle multivariate and multifactor designs.
In addition to this approach, which is a matter of statistical modeling and
estimation, more recently it has become possible to study loci on the genome more
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or less directly. After spectacular successes in  nding the loci associated with single
gene diseases (Huntington’s disease being a well known case), the search is now for
loci that contribute to complex traits. Since complex polygenic traits (intelligence,
temperament) are presumably determined by many genes (plus interactions between
them, and epigenetic effects), one such locus may contribute only a small proportion
of the variance. Typical results are that a polymorphism on exon III of chromosome
11 is associated with novelty seeking and that the proportion of shared variance is
10%. Headline-catching examples were the “gay gene,” when gay males were found
to have a higher than chance level (83% against 50% chance level) for an allele on
the long arm of X chromosome (in the Xq28 region). As Hamer and Copeland
(1998, pp. 195–197) emphasize, this result means very little as yet. However, it is an
example of the general strategy of  nding QTLs (quantitative trait loci) associated
with complex polygenic traits, which seems to open the possibility to trace a causal
path from genome to gene products (neurotransmitter receptors) to mind (intelli-
gence, temperament, etc.).
6.2. Genes, dopamine and personality
For our purposes, the most interesting aspect of this work is the way levels and
domains are related: loci on the genome (that is, base pair sequences, usually
markers, sometimes also real genes) may be related to gene products like neuro-
transmitter receptors, and gene products are presumably related to personality,
temperament and behavior. Two substances related to such gene products are
serotonin and dopamine. Serotonin is associated with depression, anger, hostility,
etc. (it has somehow something to do with Prozac, with intake of cholesterol, and is
in uenced by social rank in apes). Hamer and Copeland (1998, p. 103) interpret
serotonin as a kind of punishment drug; it makes an organism feel bad, and that
signals to the organism that something should be done about the situation. This
interpretation nicely  ts predictions by Cloninger that serotonin has something to do
with a personality or temperament characteristic called harm avoidance. Harm
avoidance is one of the four temperament domains of Cloninger’s personality scale
TPQ (Tridimensional Personality Questionnaire). (The other temperament do-
mains are “novelty seeking,” “reward dependence,” and “persistence.”)
Another example is dopamine. Recent research suggests that the number of
repeats of a sequence of 48 base pairs on the D4DR gene that codes for the D4
dopamine receptor may be related to the ability to bind dopamine; that in turn
seems to be related to novelty seeking (as measured on a questionnaire), and to risky
behavior, and perhaps ADHD (attention de cit/hyperactivity disorder). If con rmed
(it should be noted that some studies failed to con rm the association between the
number of repeats and novelty seeking), these results would constitute a case of
interacting and co-evolving levels of explanation.
As to the biochemical level, D4DR gene lies on the short arm of chromosome
11 (exon III) and codes for a dopamine receptor. Dopamine is something like a
pleasure or motivation substance. It stimulates euphoria and exploratory behavior;
dopamine de ciency is associated with immobility, as in Parkinson’s disease, excess
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of dopamine with exploratory behavior, and in extreme cases with schizophrenia.
Dopamine is also associated with a dimension on Cloninger’s personality scale TPQ
dubbed “novelty seeking” (Cloninger et al., 1996). Some of the neurochemical
mechanisms are known, including pathologies (Parkinson), and substance abuse
(like alcoholism), and the D4DR mRNA is clearly associated with the limbic system
where emotional behavior is controlled (Ebstein et al., 1996). The genetic polymor-
phism is the number of repeats of a minisatellite of 48 base pairs. Ebstein et al.
(1996) found that the more repeats, the less responsive the brain is to dopamine,
and the more novelty seeking that results. The personality type which scores high on
the novelty seeking personality is impulsive, excitable, typically the bungee jumper
or paratrooper, while low scorers are typically sedate and stolid, typically the clerk
or librarian. The gene is also related to ADHD syndrome in children.
These results should be interpreted with caution. The shared variance, i.e. the
percentage of behavioral variance that is accounted for by genetic variance, is
typically in the order of only 10%. Hamer estimates that there must be hundreds of
genes that in uence behavior and personality, and the genes associated with sero-
tonin and dopamine are only two of them. Also, there are major methodological and
statistical problems in studying associations between genes and behavior. A number
of studies failed to con rm Ebstein’s results.
That being said, the interesting novel aspect of these results as compared with
classical behavioral genetics is that now the biochemical level is directly studied,
rather than only indirectly implicated, as in twin studies, and is related to the
neurochemical level and to the psychological/personality level. Terms like “pleasure
drug” or the “gay gene” are interlevel concepts in themselves. We see descriptions
minimally at three different levels, the level of neurochemistry of emotional behavior
(dopaminergic systems in the limbic system of the brain), the loci on the genome
associated with these chemical and anatomical explanations, and moreover, the
neurochemical and the genetic level are linked with behavioral measures of person-
ality (Cloninger’s TPQ).
7. Evaluation: reduction and levels in the genetic explanation of personality
We are now in a position to evaluate the accounts of reduction mentioned above
against the backdrop of our case in behavioral genetics. Recall that the failure of
classical reduction to obtain a plausible view on bridge laws led to two responses,
autonomy/functionalism and NWR. In contrast, pluralistic views of explanation
open the possibility of synchronous coexistence of theories at different levels (un-
available to the replacement–retention continuum advocated by NWR), and mutual
feedback (unavailable to functionalists).
7.1. Classical reduction
Classical reduction assumes deduction and connecting principles as the main
ingredients of reduction: the old reduced theory must be deduced from the new
reducing theory, and the concepts of both must be connected by bridge laws. No
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such cross-theoretical identities are in sight. One reason is that the classical model
works only for completed (and formalized) theories. Schaffner (1993) suggests that
the D-N model (in Schaffner’s own modi ed version, the General Reduction
Replacement model) might have some marginal role to play, as a picture of a
completed (biomedical) science. Such a vision may be conceptually coherent and it
may be useful to keep in mind as a possible future limit case of inquiry, but as a tool
for understanding real life research it is of marginal signi cance.
So, classical reductionism is not a good account of the intertheoretic relations
between genetic and behavioral theories. There are no cross-theoretic identities in
the strict sense, and no deducibility of higher level from lower level. In our case
study, personality theories are explanatorily extended by neurochemical and genetic
 ndings on the one hand and the latter are informed by the former (“pleasure
drug”). This correction would be impossible under (classical) conditions of consist-
ency and meaning invariance. In fact, the change of meaning of concepts and
theories in psychology, and the interpretation of anatomy and biochemistry in
psychological terms is a major asset of interlevel synchronous investigation. It allows
both top–down and bottom–up in uences on theorizing. The classical model cannot
account for such mutual correction and selection pressure.
7.2. Functionalism/autonomy
Multiple realization sank the project of classical reduction: if there is an open
disjunction of identi cations, psychological laws cannot in a meaningful way be
connected cross-theoretically with genetic and neuroscienti c concepts. The func-
tionalists recognize no constraints from biology on psychological theorizing. Again,
this cannot provide an adequate picture of the situation in behavioral genetics. One
way out is to consider anything below the psychological level as implementational
details, irrelevant for psychological explanation, and in no way constraining upper
level theories (Fodor, 1981a,b). Obviously, in our case, the way temperament is
determined by gene products is highly interesting and relevant, and not to be
spurned as functionalists would have us do.
Functionalism is right in that some psychological theorizing can be done
independently of physiological underpinnings. In our case study, Cloninger devised
his personality scale from a functional psychological point of view. But as it
happened, explanatory extension (Kitcher, 1981; Hardcastle, 1992) occurred:
knowledge about brain systems, neuroanatomy and neurotransmitters can offer
additional evidence that underpins the validity of these psychological personality
constructs. This is neither autonomy nor elimination; rather functional theorizing is
a  rst step towards two-way selection pressure, where the psychological theory is
subject to cross-theoretic corroborations and criticism.
A brief remark may suf ce for the underpinnings of functionalism, the notions
of supervenience, multiple realization, and emergence. We can agree with Kim
(1998) that these have heuristic and descriptive value (for example, it seems
conceptually possible that the same phenotypic characteristics can be realized by
different genotypes, but the current one is surely dependent on physical processes).
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However, they don’t provide explanations: supervenience does no more than to state
the bare (contingent, empirical) fact (if it is a fact) that some higher-level phenom-
enon depends on a lower level; that requires rather than provides an explanation.
7.3. New Wave Reductionism
NWR succeeds in solving the problem of cross-theoretic identi cations: it allows for
the replacement of the old theory by a corrected version in the vocabulary of the
reducing new theory. The disadvantage of such a model is that it can only account
for theory succession, with some variations in the degree of retention or replacement
of the old theory’s ontology. In the genetics case there is no such diachronous
replacement (or smooth reduction) of the psychological level by the genetic—rather
synchronous coexistence of personality theory, of information on genetic coding,
and on neurotransmitters.
7.3.1. Kim’s functionalizing strategy. This strategy is a variety of reductionism. Its
main thrust is to downplay the reality of functional explanations as lacking causal
powers, and as no more than descriptions of the role played by real causal physical
processes. Again, this model does not do justice to the interplay between personality,
neurotransmitters and genomic information, and to the top–down and bottom–up
co-evolution of these theories.
In our opinion, the mistake in the philosophy of mind has been to adopt the
notions of universal causal laws from physics, and formulate the problems of
reduction in terms of the deductive relations between them. It seems a much more
viable strategy to borrow from biology, where pluralism, context dependence and
historicity of explanations is the norm. This “disciplinary disintegration” (cf. van der
Steen, 1993) tallies with explanatory pluralism that distinguishes the diachronic
dimension of theory succession, reduction and replacement, from the synchronic
dimension, allowing coexistence of partly overlapping theories. Coexistence is plaus-
ible if we realize that there are several distinct styles of explanations and domains in
biology (van der Steen, 2000), that explanations depend on context and history
(Rosenberg, 2001), and that no universal timeless laws are likely to be forthcoming
(Schaffner, 1993). Philosophers with reductionist dispositions who claim that psy-
chology must be understood as a form of biology seem to insuf ciently realize the
“middle level” nature of biological generalizations, and to construe biology along the
lines of some kind of physics. The conclusion must be that synchronous coexistence
and border traf c (including border disputes) will remain endemic in behavioral
genetics. No replacement or theory succession seems in order between biochemistry,
neuroscience and behavioral theories. Perhaps signi cantly, Bickle (2001) recently
emphasized co-evolution as a feature of moderately smooth reduction; it remains
obscure however how co-evolution  ts in a (New Wave) reductionist picture, where
only one dimension of intertheoretic relations is available, namely, the dimension of
theory succession.
It could be argued perhaps that this line of reasoning confuses descriptive and
normative concerns. The classical model is supposed to work on completed theories
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(cf. Schaffner, 1993, on “clari ed science”), and aims at a rational reconstruction,
not at factual description of the process of inquiry. Since obviously in our case
study above no mature theory is available, one could say that the D-N idea is
not applicable in the case of biological psychology, and consequently, that the
classical model is rejected prematurely. However, whenever a philosophical view
does not  t real research, the former, not the latter has a problem. The classical
model offers no resources for understanding explanatory practices, or for getting a
handle on progress in interlevel explanations. The case of biological psychology
presented above suggests that progress is made by relating co-evolving theories
at different levels, and the philosophical task is to illuminate how and why that is
the case.
8. Some remaining problems
A still insuf ciently accounted-for aspect of the new behavioral genetics is that more
than two levels of theorizing are at stake. Even a sophisticated model like HIT
(McCauley & Bechtel, 2001), which advocates looking for partial and heuristic
identi cations between different domains and theories, envisages only two levels.
How to understand selection pressure not only as mutual two-way feedback, but as
at least three distinct levels in behavioral genetics is not obvious. It also involves a
problem that has been glossed over until now: what is the weight of higher-level
explanations relative to the mechanisms of its realizers? How can the notion of
selection pressure and mutual constraints be  eshed out? For example, could
psychological theorizing be overruled by genetics? HIT only suggests that such
tensions will (usually) be heuristically productive.
Recalling the historic and contingent nature of evolutionary explanations, and
the changing relations between function and mechanism, we could imagine another
complication in modeling intertheoretical relations in biological psychology: the
cross-theoretic heuristic identities might change. The consensus in biopsychology is
that we may capitalize on homologies, in the case where temperament in mice was
related to personality in man, both under control of loci on chromosome 11 that are
supposedly homologous across mice and humans. Nothing, however, guarantees
that mechanisms of approach and avoidance, aggression and fear (dependent as
these are on environment and interaction with other organisms) remain unchanged
in the course of evolution. Biological theories, including heuristic identi cation may,
as Rosenberg (2001) argued, be historically contingent and variable.
Another issue where HIT provides little guidance is how to understand partial
identities, i.e. low but robust covariances between phenomena at different levels. In
our case study, only a small proportion of common variance is found between loci
on the genome and behavioral and questionnaire scores. We lack criteria for
converging evidence and for identi cation across theories. It might be that HIT
focuses too much on positive heuristics and perhaps we should try to develop criteria
for avoiding false positives (Schouten & Looren de Jong, 2001).
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9. Conclusion
Accounting for the complex patchwork of related explanations in a multi-level
science like biological psychology seems to require a more sophisticated and precise
way of looking at levels than the existing ideas (both reductionist and non-reduction-
ist) on explanation in the philosophy of mind, including Kim’s functionalizing
strategy, are able to provide. Above, some pluralistic proposals were sketched that
might better  t interlevel relations in biological psychology. The typical “middle
level” patchwork, located between overarching empty generalizations and local
mechanisms, characteristic for biology, suggests partial bridges between domains,
tentative identi cations between theories and systems at different levels.
The point of this paper has been that the options in the wake of the failure of
D-N reduction were too simple, and that capturing the interlevel relations in
biological psychology should draw on the resources from philosophy of biology,
especially where coexistence of partial and overlapping explanations is the case.
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